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Methodology of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project's Co-
management Survey
SEDA WOG (the Socio-economic Data Working Group of the LVFRP)'
Introduction
The methodology for the co-management survey was presented in three separate workshops, two of which
were held in Mwanza, Tanzania (3rd to 25th March 1999; 2" to 20" September 1999) and the third in Jinja,
Uganda (29th November to 3id December 1999)2. The first workshop was devoted to an introduction to the
co-management concept, supported by theoretical arguments and case study examples from other locations
in the world where there are relevant co-management experiences applicable to the Lake Victoria situation.
Towards the end of the workshop, the participants worked together to develop a field questionnaire to be
applied to assessing background information for the co-management study. In the second workshop the
participants undertook preliminary analysis of the field data. There were sessions in the workshop devoted
to establishing initial observations in relation to a series of criteria identified by Ostrom (1990) and
Pinkerton (1989) as necessary for the successful maintenance of community-based institutions, and which
were considered in relation to the data collected under the survey. The final workshop was oriented towards
a deeper analysis of the findings. Participants were asked to consider the relevance of their work in relation
to several theoretical models that could help with the interpretation of the results and development of a
framework for co-management and the riparian nations of the lake. In this chapter, the theoretical
background to the methodology is outlined, questionnaire development described, sample selection outlined
and biases and shortcomings to the survey noted. This work draws upon outputs from all three of the
workshops described above, while analytical outputs are elaborated in Chapter 4.
Co-management survey: the planning workshop (Mwanza 3rd to 25th March 1999)
The workshop theme
The theme was derived from the observation that the fisheries of Lake Victoria are not being properly
managed, especially with respect to ensuring its long-term sustainability. This situation has resulted from
the failure of the 'top-down' fisheries management process, that has proven inadequate in this respect.
Lessons from successful fisheries managemnt systems in other parts of the world have indicated that a
partnership between the user groups and the regulatory authorities of government is a suitable vehicle to
restore the benefits flow in the fishery. This partnership between regulators and government may be called
'co-management'. Thus, the theme of the workshop was to investigate the scope for the development of co-
management in the context of the fisheries of Lake Victoria. This would involve the undertaking of a
survey to examine the institutional realities of the fisheries management processes of the lake.
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Supporting research and documentation for the co-management workshop
The long-term technical assistant (LTTA) to the LVFRP, initiated and completed a series of inputs that were
designed to support the first workshop, which included a general assessment of the literature on socio-
economic issues of relevance to Lake Victoria (Geheb, 1999a), the circulation of several key papers on the
theme of co-management (Alexander, 1977; Berkes and Taghi Farver, 1989; van den Brink et al., 1994;
Gibbs and Bromley, 1989; Lino Grima and Berkes, 1989; McGrath et aL, 1993; Mearns, 1995; Price, 1995;
Thomas, 1 996), and the preparation of a briefing document on co-management in fisheries (Geheb, I 999b).
Aims and objectives of the workshop
to familiarise all participants with the objectives of the co-management and the 'three beaches'
studies;
to develop a methodology for the studies (utilising the logical framework approach);
to combine the assembled expertise of the participants to create a questionnaire that could be applied
in the field to achieve the aims and objectives;
to create a milestone plan that would equip the participants with an action framework, moving from
the planning workshop through the survey, inputting of the data, data analysis to the preparation of an
interim analysis at an analytical workshop later in 1999.
The workshop plan
The methodology comprised the following components:
an introduction to the co-management research project and the setting of this project in the context of
the overall Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project;
a session devoted to the aims and objectives of a co-management partnership;
a session introducing the fundamental theoretical underpinning of the co-management concept;
case studies on co-management from fisheries in other parts of the world;
exercises based on the use of project planning techniques to develop the methodology;
sessions devoted to the active development of the questionnaire(s) through a participative approach;
a session devoted to the sampling methodology and the analysis.
Review of the workshop sessions
Day I: The introduction to the Workshop was followed by a brief review of the problems of world
fisheries. Attention was drawn to the failure of the conventional fisheries management approach to solve
the problem of resource sustainability (McCay and Jentoft, 1998). Comments were also made on the
problems of: stock decline (Hardin, 1968; Holden, 1994); over-capacity (Holden, 1994); discards (Crean,
1988; Crean and Symes, 1994); conflict at all levels (Crean and Symes, 1996); technological 'creep'
(Bedddington and Rettig, 1983); competition between resource user groups; and finally the conflict of
objectives between resource users and regulators (Scott, 1993; Symes, 1997).
The session then continued with an account of the fundamental features that dictate the relative success and
failure of fisheries management systems (McGoodwin, 1990). The terms 'institution', 'organisation',
'property rights' and 'access rights' were all examined (Kay, 1993; Mintzberg, 1979; Morgan, 1980; 1986;
Osborne and Gaebler, 1996). It was pointed out that property is defined by ownership and rights C're
entitlements to the resource bestowed by the owner (Berkes and Taghi Farvar, 1989; Fricke, 19o5;
Seabright, 1993). The presentation indicated that, in practical terms, there are only two sets of property and
access rights conditions that really apply to modern day fisheries: common property and private property
(Clark et al., 1988). The point was made that well established property and access rights are a fundamental
ingredient of any successful fisheries management regime (Gibbs and Bromley, 1989; Hanna and
Munasinghe, 1995). This will then show who is empowered to access fish resources and those who are
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excluded. In practical terms, the traditional systems tend to hold a mix of access rights and sometimes
property rights (Crean, 1998; 1 998b; 1999). Modern fisheries management systems are experimenting with
privatisation of the resource base i.e. as a state owned resource that ìs accessible through the provision of
exclusive rights to individuals (Geen and Nayar, 1988; Hoefnagel, 1966; McKeilar, 1990).
The presentation then turned to a series of case studies. The case studies were chosen to demonstrate the
different sorts of partnership that ar embraced by the general term G co-management'. The first ease study
was based on the UK's position as a federal fisheries state within the European Union (EU) (Commission,
1991).
The EU is unique in that its policy espouses equal access to fisheries resources (Commission, 1991). hie
fisheries management system is founded on relative stability of quota shares, and there is a strong bias in the
policy towards the maintenance of fish supplies and employment opportunities. The fisheries in the EU
suffer from ever-increasing capacity and reduced resource base (Commission, 1994; Corten, 1996). It is
extremely difficult - some would say impossible to manage the activities of multiple user groups in the
mixed species envìronment of the GCommon Pond'. Law-breaking, especially illegal landings, is highly
prevalent (Crean and Symes, 1994). The source of the problems lies in the adoption of the principle of
equal access. This has tended to increase uncertainty in the fishery and encouraged irresponsible behaviour.
In an effort to stem the decline the EU and the UK in particular are examining the benefits of greater
involvement of the fishermen in the day to day implementation of the policy and management strategies
(Jentoft, 1985; Syrnes, 1995, 1997; Woodhatch and Crean, 1999). There is an emerging co-management
regime where government is still the dominant partner. This example is a relatively weak one of co-
management, where control is vested in the centre with token representation of fishermen's organisations
and other stakeholders (Phillipson and Crean, 1997; Pinkerton, 1989; Pomeroy and Williams, 1994; Symes
et al., 1995; Townsend, 1995).
By contrast, in Norway the co-management partnership is more highly developed (Mikalsen, 1996). This s,
in part, due to the better-defined properly rights basis of the fish stocks and management regime. Norway
has declared a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Fishermen (and other stakeholders) are deeply involved
in the management process, and they thus regard the fisheries policy as legitimate and equitable. The
practical fisheries management strategy is characterised by some unusual strategies to restore its stock base
- a Gno discards' policy, observers on all boats, and zoning of areas where access is restricted to only those
fishermen with good disciplinary track record. in exchange for good behaviour, fishermen get access to
excellent fishing opportunities (Isaksen et aL, 1998). This is a much more intimate co-management
relationship than the EU example (Jeritoft, 1989), where there is a highly developed consultation process
that has its roots in the culture of the people (Mikalsen, 1996). It is, in other words, an Gembeddedness
phenomenon. The Norwegian fisheries management regime is currently accommodating not only the
government and fish catchers, but has also brought in the onshore sector through Producer Organisations
(POs), More remarkably, the state is in the process of accommodating the demands of a minority tribal
group - the Sami people of Lapland. Similarly, conservationists are demanding representation on the
decision-making bodies that relate to the fisheries resources. The Norwegian co-management regime is a
significant step up from the EU model, 'out there is still some muddying of the waters concerning property
rights and access.
The third case study dealt with the community-based management system that characterises the coastal
fisheries of the Solomon Islands. Here, there is a system that is characterised by its ancient origins and
community 'embeddedness' (Akimichi, 1978; 1991; Crean, 1999). it has been, until recently, an enduring
system in which there was a high of internalisation of transaction costs (Hviding and Baines, 1992). The
system is founded ou common property but allocated with a high degree of exclusivity based on sea
territories (sea tenure) (Christy, 1982; Johannes, 1978). The local fisherman crop and husband the resources
of the sea, rather as a farmer would crop his fields. The system in the 2Qth Century setting has been eroded
by government intervention, the ingress of new technologies and contact with the globa' market for fish.
The system has been characterised by an harmonious relationship between the resource and the fishermen.
15
Sustainabitity is implicit. Until very recently the role of government was that of an interested bystander.
There is a clear definition of rights and ownership. This together with ari effective monitoring, sanctioning
and conflict resolution apparatus has made the system robust and resilient (l3aines, 1982; 1985; 1989).
The final case study dealt with the Japanese system of fisheries management. In principle, it is
fundamentally similar to the Solomon's sea tenure system. In Japan, however, the traditional laws are
enshrined in modern legal codices (Ruddle, 1987). This applies to the entire coastal zone as well as the
freshwaters of the country also. The country's fisheries have reached a very consistent level of production.
Over a period of 60 years, the production in coastal waters has been about 2.4 million tonnes (Kalland,
1996). This consistent production may be even more remarkable given that, to date, the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) in Japan lias not been established for the marine fisheries (Ruddle, 1996).
The Japanese system is founded on very clear iristitutions of property and access (Lim et /., 1995).
Fishermen are subject to strong and unanimous membership of fishermen's organisations. The ownership of
the rights is vested in the Fisheries Co-operative Associations. There is one of these organisations in each
fishing community. In effect the fishermen practise self-regulation and policing of their own resources,
although there is logistical and advisory support from the outside, in the form of 'nesting' with the
prefectural and national government authorities.
The workshop then considered which, out of all these examples of co-management, might be useful in the
development of co-management in the Lake Victoria context. The examples quoted, combined with m.y
others from natural resource exploitation systems in other sectors and other parts of the world, have enabled
the researcher Elinor Ostrom to produce a series of criteria that characterise successfully implemented
management regimes for common property resources. The so-called Ostrom criteria (Ostrom, 1990) were
presented to the participants.
In the days that followed the above presentation workshop participants considered a number of components
in the development of the methodology. The first of these considered target groups för questionnaire
administration for the survey, and also considered topics that would be addressed to them. Figure 1 below
summarises the workshop's findings.
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Exercises during the workshop subsequently sought to expand upon these issues discussed in the initial
presentation, and to determine a series of questions that would be addressed in the questionnaire. The results
of these deliberations follow.
The reievarzc of boundaries to LaJc Victoria 's fisheries
Group: Rubin Omwega, Ernest Yongo, Clemencia Nyamwenge and Olivia Mkumbo.
The political boundaries that currently exist are national boundaries traversing the lake, provisional/regional
boundaries, district boundaries, divisional boundaries and locational boundaries. The group felt that
communities along the lake shore had rarely aftempted to establish boundaries and that villagers have, in the
past, generally felt that anyone who wishes to exploit the lake ought to be allowed to. More recently,
however, there is sorne feeling that more and more outsiders should not be allowed to the lake through
communities with whom they are not affiliated. Although the feeling exists, however, villagers feel they
have no mechanism by which to exclude outsiders. The group felt that boundaries could potentially cause
bad blood between communities. The group felt that there were some restrictions on fisheunen moving from
beach to beach. For example, fishermen always have to properly identify themselves and where they come
from in an attempt to curb theft. The group considered fishing grounds as a possible focus for boundary
creation. Fishermen, the group said, can identify these places, which may change according to seasons.
These grounds, however, are not 'owned' as such, but shared by all those communities who use them.
Fishing grounds differ between species of fish targeted. Beaches may also be characterised by the fish
targeted - hence, dagaa beaches need to have plenty of open space upon them to dry nets on. The group also
considered fish nurseries as a possible focus for boundaries, and said that fishermen do know where these
are, and will comment on regulatory difficulties in ensuring that fishermen do not fish there. Tanzani it
was explained, does have closed seasons in force on bays along its coastline for the first six months of the
year, a period which fishermen feel is too long.
FISH NET
INUFACTIJPERS
BOAT MAKERS/
SUPPLIERS
- Others?
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Notions offish abundance on Lake T'Yctoria
Group: Denis Tweddle, Konstantin Odongkara and Johanna Budeba.
The group identified a number of areas it felt the study should target. They were as follows:
Perceptions of the reasons for resource scarcity: ecological/human origins.
Has abundance changed, and if so why?
Why is the dagaa fishery expanding - is it because of increased demand or because there is more
dagaato be fished.
Why have gear changes occurred?
What is the level of knowledge concerning damage to fish stocks by trawlers? What are fishermen's
perceptions of the conflict between trawlers and their damaging fishermen's nets?
What are perceptions of Garidina increases?
Why do fishermen target particular species?
What is the relationship between fishermen and fish processing plants?
The group recommended that fish net manufacturers be included as a target group under the study. lt also
felt that those resource changes the study seeks to identify should be restricted to recent resource changes.
The presence of comm unity sanctions on Lake Victoria
Group: Anne Nyapendi, Joseph Gonga, Richard Abila Eliza Mlahagwa
The group firstly defined what it meant by 'community sanctions' as being those punishments imposed upon
anyone who contravenes community governance or rules.
The group also defined a 'community' as a group of people living together under one governance or set of
rules.
The group considered a number of possible community-based sanctions, including expulsion of offenders,
fines, suspension, warnings and cautions, confiscation of illegally earned money or illegally obtained goods.
Flogging. The group posed a number of central questions that should concern the study:
What rules do communities presently have?
What punishments do they currently possess?
(e) To whom should sanctions imply?
(d) What is the level of respect for status and/or property?
The group emphasised that the sanctions to which it refers in these questions are 'informal' in nature. It vias
revealed that in Uganda, community-based rules and sanctions have been challenged in court, as have
statutes of the fisheries regulations. In Tanzania, it was revealed that villages have 'police' groups, called
sungusungu, who may exact punishment upon offenders because punishments delivered by central
government are thought too light. These sungusungu are legally sanctioned by the Tanzanian state and
operate as a kind of village-level police force.
In what or whom is control vested?
Group: Faith Omwenga, Martin van der Knaap, Mercy Kyangwa and Kim Geheb.
The group divided its investigations into identifying where control is vested in the past, the present and the
future.
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In the past: in Uganda, there were beach leaders named 'gabwiga' who sought to resolve minor conflicts
between fishennen. These were answerable to a council of village elders. The group advised that the extent
to which water territories and the presence of fisheries regulations in the past needs to be examined, as does
the role of spiritual and/or religious regulation of the resource. It also considered people with land on the
lake also played a role in regulating the lake's fishery in the past.
The present: Fisheries Departmcnts, District administration
- and District Fisheries Officers in Uganda.
There are Assistant Fisheries Officers present at every landing in Uganda. Every village in Uganda has an
elected councillor (the LC1). Groups of 3-4 villages comprise parishes governed by an LC2. LC3s, LC4s
and LC5s have representation at the sub-county, county and finally the district level. In Kenya, the sub-
location is lead by a government appointee, a sub-chief, and the hierarchy above him/her is the chief, the
District Officer and finally, the District Commissioner. In Kenya, cooperatives and their committees may
have local power, although the degree of power varies from beach to beach. The economic power of fish
processing factories in the structure of fish processing, fishing tactics and the structure of fish landings is
considerable. In Tanzania, people owning large fleets and/or having control over large fleets through
indebtedness and other patriarchal relationships wield tremendous power. Fishermen's organisations such as
UFFCA in Uganda, and the LVFU in Kenya, may have some power, as do processor's associations.
The group identified fish processors, Fisheries Departments, communities and fishermen's organisations as
possessing much power in the future. A fisheries advisory board receiving complaints from fishermen and
their communities, and passing these on to fisheries authorities was also considered.
Group discussion following presentation of the groups discussions revealed that there are Local Defense
Units in many of Uganda's communities, elected by community members and sent away for government
defence training. Their role comprises a part of Uganda's defence plans. Additional sources of power may
be NGO's. Other possibilities are beach owners. In Uganda, there are some beaches where women are not
permitted. Ugandan's also have a lake God, the Mukasa, and the Kabaka will sometimes pay obeisance to
the God of the island of Bokasa, from which lake cleansing may occur. It was also revealed that in Tanzania,
the sunguswigu groups referred to earlier, may themselves be breaking laws, like stealing nets.
The final questionnaires used for the Co-management Survey appear at the end of this paper.
Co-management survey: data analysis workshop (Mwanza 2' to 20th September 1999)
The workshop desia
The workshop covered the necessary stages up to development of the draft executive summary and overall
structure of the final report sessions on sampling bias, the development of the methodology and assessment
of the research findings. The participants divided themselves into groups (on national lines) and proceeded
to debate the main points arising from their experiences gained in the survey. Each group elected a
chairman and a rapporteur was identified. On completion of the specific sessions, the rapporteurs presented
the findings of the group to those in the other groups. Further discussion ensued, then the findings were
inputted to the workshop master document. The results of these deliberations represent the principal
components of the Co-management Survey's methodology, and are as follows:
Uganda
Group: K. O. Odongkara, A. Nyapendi, J. Gonga & A. Atai
Objectives of the co-management survey
To find out whether or not conditions at lake-side landings were conducive to the establishment of co-
management as a management strategy for Lake Victoria.
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Outputs
The co-management survey will provide an understanding of:
Perceptions and reasons for resource scarcity.
Suggested actions to be taken.
(e) Fishermen 's perceptions of present management strategies.
Externalities affecting fishing activities.
The collective activities of fishing communities.
Fishermen' s knowledge of existing fishing regulations.
The results will benefit:
Designers of regional co-management strategies.
Partners in co-management, including:
Fishermen
Traders
Fish processors
Consumers
(y) Researchers
Selection of beach landings for surveying
There are ten districts bordering the Ugandan shoreline of Lake Victoria:
1. Masaka 2. Rakai 3. Kalangala 4. Mukono
5. Kampala 6. Mpigi 7. Jinja 8. Iganga
9. Bugiri 10. Busia
In every district, a minimum of two beach landings were selected for study. Selected beaches all had more
than 20 boats so as to ensure that a minimum number of questionnaires could be administered at each
landing. In addition, landings selected were those that had not been visited previously in an attempt to avoid
research fatigued respondents. The landings visited are indicated in Table I below, and appear on the map in
Figure 2.
Table I Ugandan landing sites investigated for the Co-management survey. Numbers alongside correspond
to map ocations given in Figure 2.
Data were collected between May 20t1, 1999 and September 10th, 1999. Fishers (boat owners), crew, gear
owners, district administrators and industrial processors were targeted for interviewing. These target groups
were selected either because they are directly involved in the management of Lake Victoria or because
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1. Kasenseo 9. Mabati 17. Wanyange
2. : 10. Sanya 18. Wairaka
2. Malembo 11. Katebo
3 [ombu 12. Kitubulu 19. Walumbe
4. Karnuwuna '. District 20. Namoni
3- Kakin,ak Eisn 13. Ggaba 9. &'r .)trct
5. Kasekulo . iíkcúo Drict
1
21. Bumeru 'B'
6. Kitobo 14. Nkombwe i (1. sk (IT) Dístrct
7. Banda 15. Kigaya 22. Madwa
8. Makako 16. Kikondo
they were thought to possess knowledge of direct managerial relevance. The sample was not randomly
selected. A total of 343 respondents were interviewed in Uganda.
Questionnaire design
Three study groups - one from each participating country
- were formed to generate ideas for inclusion in
the questionnaire. Following the assimilation of these ideas, a draft questionnaire was produced ready for
testing. Each country tested their questionnaires and ideas and suggestions were passed on to the LTTA for
dissemination to riparian country study teams. The questionnaire was divided into the following sections:
Background information.
Perceptions of resource scarcity.
(e) Reasons for resource scarcity.
Action to be taken.
Role of the state.
Externalities.
Collective activities.
Fishing regulations.
The data coding system was adapted from previous surveys carried out under this project in which evy
question was pre-coded. So as to facilitate data entry, the number of possible answers allowable to
respondents was restricted, usually to no more than one.
The main problems encountered during the survey were time constraints and not having a clearly defined
sample selection strategy.
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Kenya
Group: E. O. Yongo, C. Lwenya, R. Abila, F. Omwenga & R. Omwega
Objectives of the co-management survey
To collect data and information on the potential for co-management in the administration of Lake Victoria' s
fisheries.
Consideration of the co-management approach is important because state-based managerial strategies within
the fishery no longer work, and alternative management strategies are being sought which involve the
fishery' s stakeholders.
Outputs
The survey will present stakeholder's perceptions on the co-management of the lake. Stakeholders, the
fishery as a whole, national economies and the lake's biodiversity stand to benefit.
Iiig
Sampling commenced on June 6th 1999 and carried on until August 31 1999. After the completion of every
field trip, the data were entered into EXCEL, and then transferred to project headquarters for conversion in
to SPSS and assimilation with other regional data. A two stage stratified sampling strategy was employ..
Beach landings were selected for sampling on the basis of dístriets. Two categories of beaches were
sampled: small beaches, comprising those with 24 or less boats on them, and large beaches, comprising
those with 25 or more boats on them. A total of 24 small landings were sampled (these being more common)
and 10 large ones. The selection of beaches within each district was random. The number of beaches
selected per district reflects each district's population size. Once at the landing site, the selection of
respondents was not random. A total of 405 Kenyan respoidents were interviewed. Beaches in all lake-side
districts except for Homa Bay District (District No. 15) were sampled and are as follows:
Table 2: Kenyan landing sites investigated for the Co-management survey. Numbers alongside correspond,
to map locations given in Figure 2.
Principal limiting factors in the survey were the poor state of access roads and beaches blocked due to water
hyacinth.
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Tanzath
Group: M. N. Medard, P, Onyango, E. Mlahagwa & B. Zenge. C. Kirema Mukasa (Uganda, LYFO
Observer)
Origins of the co-management survey
In Tanzania, co-management began to be discussed in 1994 following the failure of a beach seine and under-
size net bans. At the same time, managerial difficulties on the lake were compounded by high rates of gear
theft on the lake. initiatives made to develop alternative managerial strategies were spearheaded by
industria! processing plants who set about trying to develop a managerial system that would involve
fisherfolk, and benefit from material inputs supplied by the factories to 'fishing communities and the
Fisheries Department. Against this background, the need to consider co-managerial alternatives arose.
Objectives of the co-management survey
So as to attempt to eradicate the use of illegal fishing gear and methods, it was important to:
Develop a community management regime for sustainable fisheries management.
Identify relevant ìnterest groups who could participate in fisheries management.
Establish local management schemes in pilot areas to examine community abilities to manage the
fishery.
The importance of the survey is that:
It may contribute to the wise use of the resource through the promotion of properly regulated
fishing.
It may contribute to the sustainable use of the resource base and the assurance of incomes over time.
It may deliver power in to the hands of fishing communities to decide on the fate of resources under
their control.
It may facilitate the management of the fishery by ensuring that all resource users are accountable to
both present and future generations of resource users.
A selection of stakeholders, including fishermen, fish processors and traders, consumers, the government
and riparian communities al! stand to benefit from the research.
Outputs
A co-management plan for Lake Victoria and the sustainable socio-economie development of the lake
region for present and future generations and a possible model on which to base it.
Questionnaire design
The design of the questionnaire evolved from a workshop held in Mwanza, Tanzania from March 15 19th,
1999. The lay out for the questionnaire is described above.
Sampling
A stratified, purposive sampling technique was used to select beach landings for this survey. Beaches were
selected on the basis of the permanence (temporary beaches and settlements were excluded). Large beaches
(with 50 or more boats) were identified with the assistance of the Fisheries Department. Smaller beaches
were identified in situ, with help from DFOs. Data collection commenced on July 28m, 1999 and ended on
September 9th, 1999. In total 334 interviews were carried out in Tanzania at 28 landing sites, which are
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provided in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Tanzanian landing sites investigated for the Co-management survey. Numbers alongside
correspond to map locations given in Figure 2.
Limitations to field work
Because the Tanzanian survey team commenced fieldwork late, they had difficulties completing
data collection on time.
Despite an increase in the number of staff that went to the field, staffing numbers were still
inadequate.
The poor condition of roads prevented the team from visiting some beaches.
Bias assessment: Uganda
Group: Konstantine Odongkara, Mercy Kyangwa, Anne Nyapendi, Joseph Gonga & Alice Atai.
Sample selection strategy
Who was interviewed in the survey?
Fisheries Department personnel: efforts were made to interview, in every case, District Fisheries
Officers (DFOs). This was not, however, normally possible, because offices were normally staffed
only by junior staff. In the end, only three DFOs were interviewed, and the remainder of the FD
interviews were administered to Assistant Fisheries Officers.
'Fishermen' comprised boat owners, crew and gear owners.
Respondents from industrial processing factories included both proprietors and managers.
Once on the landings, how did you choose the respondents interviewed?
The interview team first introduced themselves to the local authorities and 'gabungas' (beach
leaders), and explained their intentions. These authorities then mobilised the fishermen, addressed
them, and explained the team's objectives. After this, those who were willing were taken off to
secluded spots and interviewed, one at a time.
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Bwai
25. Mwisungwi District
62. Choie
. i
72.
koba Urban Dist.
Nyamkazi52.
53. Kome 63. Mitego 73.
31. Bukoba
Kifungu
Rural Dist,21. Banda District 5. Sengerema District
54. Kisorya 64. Buyagu 74. Igabilo
55. Kibara 65. Chimfufu 75. Malehe
22. Ukerewe District 7. eita District
56. Malelema Is. 66. Chelameno
57. Bugorola 67. Mchangani/Wenazi
Sample selection strategy and the dynamics of fieldwork
How did local conditions affect your choice of respondent?
!naccessible landings: the roads to landing sites are often very bad and/or obstructed. As a result,
some landings could not be reached. This difficulty was compounded by the often large distances to
landing sites. Remote landing sites - such as those on iskmds - often lacked accommodation for the
team to stay in.
Some landings visited had 'research fatigue' having been visited by research teams many times
previously. Respondents there often complained that they had not benefited from the visits, and their
standards of living had not improved. Occasionally, fishermen at the landings were hostile and/or
indifferent to the team, making interviewing very difficult. Some sites scheduled for visits had
moved.
Occasionally, the researchers were mistaken for tax offic :rs. and fishermen would, therefore, hide
information and even run away.
Why were specific populations targeted and not others?
The groups targeted for this survey were fishermen (boat owners, crew and gear owners), district
administrators and fish processors. These groups were seen to be directly involved in the
management of the fishery and/or that they were more knowledgeable about its management.
Other groups such as artisanal fish processors and traders, consumers, gear manufacturers, gear
renters and researchers were not targeted because hey were not directly involved in the
management of the resource, or less knowledgeable about management and so create problems for
management. For example, artisanal processors may process juvenile Nile perch or poisoned fish.
Others may encourage illegal fishing activities.
Respondents' typical reactions to the survey questionnaire
How did respondents react to you?
Respondents were occasionally suspicious and sometimes worried that researchers were tax officers.
At other times, respondents hoped that the research team had come to distribute goods on the beach,
such as nets. Generally, however, respondents were comfortable and cooperative.
What did you do to make respondents feel comfortable?
Researchers introduced themselves, and explained their aims and objectives in their local languages.
Ouestionnaire testing
The questionnaire was tested at two landing sites comprising two different ethnic groups. 47 questionnaires
were administered. As a result, spelling mistakes were identified and the research teams were able to
familiarise themselves with the question taire. Repetitious questions were ironed out and additions made.
Because suggestions for changes to the questionnaire came from different countries, it was difficult to
incorporate all of them. Because suggested changes were often the result of conditions or characteristics
specific to the countries involved, they were sometimes not really applicable to the other two countries.
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Questions which were ineffective (refer to questionnaires at end of paper)
A3 Marital status: [1] Married [2] Divorced/single/separated: the options available to some questions,
such as A3, were not always exhaustive.
A7 Has your ethnic group been historically associated with fishing? This was occasionally a difficult
question. The Samia, for example, are an ethnic group who have historically been associated with
the fishery. The respondent, however, might come from a clan within the group which did not have
an historical association with the fishery, resulting in some confusion.
G17a In your village, are any of the following present? [1] Fisheries co-operatives
[2] Marketing groups [3] Savings/credit groups etc. Although the team were under instructions to
not read out the options available to respondents, it was necessary with this questions.
Occasionally, instructions accompanying questions were unclear or difficult to follow.
Recommendations for future survey design
A harmonised and clearly defined sample selection strategy should be formulated and adopted.
Frame surveys should be carried out to facilitate sample selection and survey planning in the future.
Ample time should be allocated to designing the questionnaire so that researchers are familiarised
with what is required of them.
Bias assessment. Kenya
Group: Richard Abila, Carolyne Lwenya, Rubin Omwega, Ernest Yongo & Faith Omwenga
The sample selection strategy
Who was interviewed?
Boat owners, crew, retired fishermen, District Fisheries Officers (DFOs) and gear owners.
Once on the landings, how did you choose the respondents interviewed?
Initially, the register of boats at beaches was consulted in order to identif, a sample. More often
than not, however, boats on the register had departed and the method was no longer used.
Subsequently, at small beaches, anyone who was available to be interviewed was selected. At larger
beaches, the first four respondents were selected randomly, after which the beach leader would
recommend additional communicants.
The sample selection strategy and the dynamics of fieldwork
(a) How did local conditions affect your choice of respondents?
At small beaches, because of the low number of fishermen, everyone was interviewed. At larger
beaches, the research teams sought to interview at least 24 respondents per landing beach.
Obtaining the target figure was not always possible for several reasons. Differences in landing times
were sometimes a problem. Hence, dagaa fishers arrived early in the morning while Nile perch
fishermen arrived late in the evening. Either of these groups may not have been interviewed
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depending on the arrival time of the research team on the landing.
Drunkenness was common at most landings and interfered with interviewing.
Some landings were journeyed to, only to find that they were blocked off by water hyacinth and that
there were no fishermen working there. Alternative survey sites then had to be identified.
When asked, beach leaders would locate respondents for interviewers. In these cases, it was
invariably prosperous fishermen that they selected. Similarly, when crew members were asked to
nominate respondents, these would nearly always be crew members as well.
Some fishermen may not have been interviewed because they landed their fish at beaches other than
those they were registered.
Some fishermen who also worked as traders may not have been interviewed because they were too
busy selling their fish.
The weather was sometimes apt to change very suddenly, particularly in the islands, and interviews
would have to be terminated early as a result. At other times, respondents would tire of the
interview and just leave.
(b) What logistical factors intervened to affect respondent choice?
Language was sometimes a problem with members of the interview team unable to speak local
languages.
Some potential respondents would not be interviewed because the interview team had no incentives
to offer them.
During full moon periods, when dagaa fishing does not occur, the latter group of fishermen were
rarely at the landings and so could not be interviewed.
Respondents' typical reactions to the survey questionnaire
Respondents were typically curious and cooperative, and were generally comfortable having it administered
to them. In order to placate any worries that the fishermen might have, all interviewing was arranged
through the beach leader and never through Fisheries Department staff.
Questionnaire testing
The questionnaire was tested upon 24 respondents derived from three beach landings. Testing resulted in a
number of changes to the questionnaire, and subsequent fieldwork was much facilitated as a result.
Questions which were ineffective (refer to questionnaires at end of paper)
Dl Statements 3 (Fishing communities must be allowed to say who can or cannot fish) and 4
(Fishermen should be allowed to say 'this is my water' and to protect it from outsiders) were very
similar.
El Statement 3 Fishermen on this beach are friendly with Fisheries Dept. personnel: the option
sometimes worried fishermen, because they thought it might imply that they had friendship with
Fisheries Department staff by 'purchasing' it.
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FI Statements I (You cannot catch enough fish when there are lots of boats in the place where you
fish) and 2 (Your gear will often get tangled with the gear of others fishing in the same place) were
very similar.
G7/G9 If you knew that a fellow fisherman was using an illegal fishing method, what is the first thing you
would do?! Ifa neighbouring community were to accuse your community of stealing their nets, how
would the problem be solved? Both these questions allow the respondent only one option. In most
cases, however, respondents wanted to provide several options.
G IO Who owns the waters adjacent to your fishing village? In most cases, fishermen responded that the
lake was a 'gift from God' or else owned by the government.
G I 5a Is there anywhere on this lake where you cannot fish? Options i (River mouths),
2 (Fish nurseries) and 4 (Closed areas) overlapped: i.e. all could be construed to be closed areas.
I-Il We would like to know if the government's fishing regulations help to conserve fish stocks on the
lake. Do you think the following are effective or useless? Options follow. There were some
difficulties interpreting this question, which were discussed with the LTTA and clarified.
H3/F-14 Over the year, are there closed seasons in the places where you normally fish?/Does the government
ban you from fishing in certain areas? These two questions were very similar.
In some cases, explanation of subtle differences to respondents clarified matters. In other cases, where there
were conflicting questions, there was little to be done.
There were no areas in the questionnaire that fishermen considered sensitive nor offensive.
Recommendations for future survey design
Incentives should be offered to respondents.
At some landings, KMFRI has staff permanently located collecting catch data. These are well known to
fishermen and accepted, and should therefore be used in future data collection.
Certain questions within the questionnaire were phrased in such a way that their meaning was ambiguous, or
could be interpreted in several different ways. Future surveys should seek to avoid such ambiguity through
widespread consultation within and between regional survey teams.
Bias assessment: Tanzania
Group: Modesta Medard, Paul Onyango, Elizabeth Mlahagwa & Bell Zeuge. Carolyne Kirema-Mukasa
(Uganda, LVFO Observer).
Sample selection strategy
(a) Who was interviewed for the survey?
Fishermen
Fishery administrators (District Fisheries Officers)
Owners of fish processing plants
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(b) How were respondents selected?
The number of boats present at the beach on the day of the visit was first determined, from which 12
fishermen were then selected, with at least one from each of the chosen boats. Beach leaders,
Fisheries Officers and Village Executive Officers (VEOs) were used to help identi'ing
respondents.
Given the time constraints of the survey, the sampling strategy described was satisfactory. A more
systematic surveying strategy, however, would have been preferable. The fishery in which the respondent
was involved and the amount of time s/he had been involved in it would have been considered in sample
selection.
Sample selection strategy and the dynamics of fieldwork
How local conditions affected the choice of respondents.
Roads to the beaches were in very poor condition, delaying arriva! at the beaches, and hence
missing potential respondents.
The commencement of fieldwork was delayed and there was a deadline. Hence, fieldwork was
hurried.
Budgetary constraints prevented the employment of additional enumerators.
An anti-beach seining and fish poisoning operation had been carried out by the Fisheries
Department not long before the commencement of fieldwork. When the project vehicle (with its
government registration plates) approached the landings, many fishermen either ran away or
avoided the field team.
At some beaches, powerflul members of the community may have influenced respondents to answer
questions in certain ways, particularly those questions seeking opinions about the Fisheries
Department or fishing regulations.
At some survey sites, respondents sometimes suffered from survey fatigue having been subjected to
many previous surveys. They often complained that they did not get to see the results of surveys and
that the surveys never prompted any change.
There was, during fieldwork, a ban on exports of Nile perch to the European Union. As a result,
many Nile perch fishermen were available for interviewing at landings.
Logistical factors affecting respondent choice
Allowances for Fisheries Department staff and VEOs were not available and this sometimes caused
problems.
Staff shortages at TAFIRI ensured that it was not always the same enumerators who went in to the
field.
(e) Choke of target samples
Fishermen were targeted for this survey because they have a very immediate impact on the ecology
of the lake.
Industrial processors were selected because they affect fishermen who, in turn, affect the ecology of
the lake.
Fisheries administrators were targeted because they play a key role in determining entry into the
fishery.
Respondents' typical reactions to the survey
Many respondents complained that the questionnaire was too long.
Some were very suspicious of being questioned, particularly if they used illegal gear or fishing techniques.
Some respondents were mistaken in thinking that, by answering questions, they would gain some kind of
financial assistance.
Generally, however, respondents were comfortable being questioned and not intimidated. This occurred
because the survey team always clearly explained their intentions before surveying commenced and because
they were able to adapt themselves to local conditions.
Questionnaire testing
Testing of the survey questionnaire was carried out in Mara and Mwanza Regions. Testing occurred in both
rural and urban settings and considered the following factors:
Duration of questioning
The logical flow of the questions
The relevance of the question to co-management
The clarity of the questions
The relevance of the options accompanying the questions
Several suggestions for changes were made, but these were only considered for the industrial processors
questionnaire because field work for the co-management survey had already commenced in Uganda and
Kenya.
The questionnaire was translated into Kiswahili.
Questions that were ineffective (refer to questionnaires at end of paper)
Cl What do you think is the most important reason for catch scarcity, options 2 (fish not
breeding/migrating to other areas) and 4 (pollution/hyacinth) were contained unrelated components.
Dl First statement: New fishermen, boats or nets must be stopped from coming into the fishery: this
should have been re-phrased to imply no further licensing of fishermen would be allowed.
Fourth statement: Fishermen should be allowed to say 'this is my water' and to protect it from
outsiders: respondents were not clear as to who 'outsiders' comprised.
El Third statement: Fishermen on this beach are friendly with Fisheries Dept. personnel: respondents
sometimes thought that by saying that they were friendly with Fisheries Department personnel, they
might imply that they were involved in some kind of illegal agreement with them. Conversely, they
were sometimes frightened to say that they were not friendly with the Fisheries Department as there
were typically Fisheries Officers present during questioning.
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G7 if you knew that a Ici low fisherman was using an illegal fishing method, what is the uirst thing you
would do? What 'illegal fishing' implied was iìot always clear to respondents.
G lia Can anyone fish in the waters adjacent to your fishing community? 'Anyone' dici not clearly
indicate geographical boundaries.
G I 7a In your village, arc any of the following present? [I] Fisheries co-operatives;
12 Marketing groups [3] Savings/credit groups... etc. Fishermen sometimes thought that the
questions suggested that financial assistance was on its way.
GIS In your fishing village are there fishing rules that arc made by the community? Option 3
(Restrictions on where you can fish), 4 (Restrictions on who can fish) and 5 (Restrictions on certain
methods and/or gear) were often seen to be government regulations and not community formulated
Ofl CS
i-II \Ve would like to know if the government's fishing regulations help to conserve fish stocks on the
lake. Do you think the following are effective or useless? An opion 'ineffective' would have been
helpful.
Following clarification and explanation to respondents, most of the above difficulties were remedied.
Sensitive areas for questioning
Respondents were sensitive to questions on illegal and legal fishing techniques.
Questions in section E of the questionnaire (frequency of PD arrests, visits, gear seizure etc.) were
often perceived as trying to find fault with the Fisheries Department.
In most cases, once questions had been explained andlor clarified to respondents, most of these difficulties
were remedied.
Recommendations for future survey design
The amount of time allocated for field work should be doubled.
Control questions that confirm answers should be included in questionnaires.
Questions on how local communities group themselves should be included.
The number of staff going in to the field should be increased to between seven and ten.
If there are large variations between results from Tanzania and those from Kenya and Uganda, this
may be because of the small sample size. In order to avoid this possibility, the sample size for
Tanzania should be increased.
Questions posed should be positive. i.e., they should not be phrased negatively: e.g. the regulations
are not effective. Certain terms utilised in the questionnaire would benefit from 'softening'. For
example, 'gear that the government does not want' could replace 'illegal'.
(h) Focus group interviews should be carried out in a few, selected communities prior to questionnaire
design so as to solicit ideas on community needs and problems, and issues that communities want to
see being addressed.
Other considerations
Co-management questionnaire should also have been administered to the following target groups: fisheries-
related groups, marketing and fish processing groups, farmers and other potentially important groups such as
mining organisations and industrial manufacturers.
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Name of enumerator:
1 Name of survey site:
2 District:
Date:
E VICTORIA FISHERIES RESEARCH PROJECT
The Co-Management Sub-Project: Questionnaire
A. Background Information
Al Respondent's sex:
A2 Age:
A3 Marital status: [1]
[2]
A4 Education: [1]
A5 For how long have you fished (accumulated years):
[1] < 1 yr [2] 2-5 yrs. [3] 6-10 yrs.[4] >11 yrs.
A6 Ethnic group:
A7 Has your ethnic group been historically associated with fishing?
[I] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
A8 What is the main fish species that you target (1 option only):
[1] Nile perch [2] tilapia [3] dagaa
[4] Other:
B Perceptions of resource scarcity
Bi How do you feel about fish catches? Consider the following statements:
Case No.
A7
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
There is less fish now than 5 years ago 1 2 3
It takes longer now to capture the same amount of fish than it did 5 years
ago.
1 2 3
There are fewer fish species in my catch now than 5 years ago 1 2 3
There are more boats now than 5 years ago 1 2 3
The fish I catch now are smaller than 5 years ago 1 2 3
There are more illegal techniques now than 5 years ago i 2 3
Fishing pays less now than 5 years ago. i 2 3
[1] Male [2]
Married
Divorced/single/separated
None [4]
Primary [5] Other:
Female
Tertiary education
Al
A2
A3
A4 6
Secondary
A8 o
Bi ii-17
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C R casons ¡br scarcity
C \Vhat cia you think is 1/ic most important rcason 'at catch scarcity (I opt ion only):
j 'loo many fishermen/boats/nets
[21 Fish not breed ng/ni igrat ing to other areas
[3j Fishing regulations are not obeyed
[4 Po i ution/hyac
Don't know
No catch declines
Other:
C4 We would like to know why some fishermen use under-size nets and illegal fishing
techniques. Please consider the following statements:
Cl 18
C4 25-27
38
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
They will not get enough fish unless they use a small mesh-size. 1 2 3
Small mesh-sizes are cheaper than large ones. 1 2 3
People use illegal fishing techniques because they are not stopped by the
Fisheries Dept.
1 2 3
C2a
C2b
Over the last 5 years, is tiere any Species that lias increased in abundance?
[I] Yes [2] No (Go to C3) 3] Don't know (Go io C3)
li yes'. \vli ich species? (No tiiore than 2 options)
I J N i le Perch 121 tilapia [3] dagna [4] shrimps
[5] haplo.s [6] Oilier:
C2 19
C2h 20-21
C3a Over the past 5 years, do you think there is any one fishery that has been attracting more and
more investment?
C3 a 22
[I] Yes [2] No(GotoC4) [3] Don'tknow(GotoC4)
C3b If 'yes', which fishery has attracted the most investment? (1 option only).
[I] Nile perch C3b 23
[2] tilapia
[3] dagaa
[4] Other:
C3c If 'yes',
[I]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
what is the most important reason for fishermen to invest in it? (1 option only)
Because it is more abundant than other fisheries
Because there is higher demand/bigger markets for it
Because it is an easier species to catch than others.
Because gear for it is cheap
Other:
C3c 24
D Action to be taken
Dl We are trying to develop some ideas for managing the lake in the future. Please tell
us what you think about the fóllowing statements:
E The role of the stnte
El We would like to knoví how you feai about the work of the Fisheries Dept. Please consider the
following statements:
E2 HOW often do Fisheries Dept. personnel come here? (1 option only)
[1] All the time [2] Sometimes [3] Never
E3 How often do you see fishermen breaking the fishing regulations? (i option only)
[1] Ail the time [2] Sometimes [3] Never
E4 How often are fishermen arrested for breaking the rules? (1 option only)
[I] AU the time [2] Sometimes [3] Never
E5 How often do Fisheries Dept. personnel destroy illegal gear on this beech? (1 option only)
[i] All the time [21 Sometimes [3] Never
E6 In the past year have you witnessed Fisheries Dept. personnel seizing catches caught using
illegal fishing gear/techniques? (1 option only)
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Not sure
n
39
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
New fishermen, boats or oats must be stopoedi om coaling hito the
fishery
1 2 3
The government and oaroinuuity roust take (government) 1shbg
regulations more seriously
2 3
Fishing communities must be allowed to say who con or cannot flsh 1 2 3
P'isliermen should be abO\!ed to say tids is my water' and to protect it
from outsiders
1 2 3
Fìshiug communities should be allowed to punish offenders i 2 3
There should be Fisheries Dept. personnel living at this landing to
monitor fishing activity all the time.
1 2 3
Fishing communities should be allowet Lo participate in making fishing
rules
1 2 3
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
The fisheries regulations are no good.
People generally obey the fisheries regulations 1 3
Fishermen on this beach are friendly with Fisheries Dept. personnel. I 3
The Fisheries Dept. does not do well protecting fish stocks i
El 35-38
E2 39
E3 40
E4 41
E5 42
E6 43
F Exteriwlities
FI Sornetimes the actions of others can affect your work. We would like to know if you
think this is true. Consider the following statements:
G
G I
02
03
04
fi] Noone
12] Only the people in your house
[31 Fellow fisherruerL
[4] lt's not possible to keep such information secret
[5] Others:
G5 When you have problems in the fishery, to whom do you complain first? (1 option only)
Fellow fishermen
Fisheries Dept. representative
Your beach leader
The po1ic
[3] The elders
[6] Don't know
[7] Other:
06 in your village, whose instructions would you obey in a fisheries related matter? (I
option only)
Fisheries Dept. representative
Other govemment official
Boat owner(s)
Beach leader
Elders
Skipper
Don't know
[II] Other:
05
40
Agree Dis-
sree
Not
sure
eicut su 'lien £h c i o s
v!::-.;
3
Vili I Ì(.' rC I WILLi ti ee o ì s ''te
same plrce.
3
1f ou et to youi tishw tound late I may not cch tiSi t 3
You uil no ctçh og ii u soiue isheuuen keep ca cii,u sm'L o'ies I / 3
Co/Iectve rctivities
Do you know everyone in your village by sight? 31 4
[I] Yes [2] No [3] Not sure
Wouid you ever go fishing in the saine place with fishermen from another community? 02 49
[1] Yes [2] No [31 Not sure
When you go fishing, it is always with the same groups of fishermen? 03 50
[i] Yes [2] No [3] Not sure
If you were to find a place where there were good catches, who would you tell? (1 option
only)
G8 If a fisherman from your community were to accuse another fisherman of stealing his nets,
how would the problem be solved? (1 option only)
41
[1] The two fishermen would have to sort it out by themselves 08 5
[2] It would be solved by community elders or at a community meeting
[3] The police would solve the matter
[4] It would be solved by a government representative
[5] Other:
[6] Don't know
09 If a neighbouring community were to accuse your community of stealing their nets, how
would the problem be solved? (I option only)
[1] No one would try to solve it
[2] You would fight your neighbour G9 56
[3] Their leaders would meet with your leaders
[4] Help would be sought from the government
[5] Help would be sought from the police
[6] Other:
[7] Don't know
010 Who owns the waters adjacent to your fishing village? (1 option only)
[1] Nobody/everybody
[2] The government GlO 57
[3] My kinsfolk
[4] An individual
[5] Don't know
[6] Other:
011a Can anyone fish in the waters adjacent to your fishing community? Gua 58
[1] Yes (Go to G12) [2] No [3] Don't know
Glib If'no' who is allowed to fish there? (No more than 2 options)
[I] Kinsfolk Glib 59-60
[2] Community members
[3] Anyone who has obtained permission
[4] Other:
G7 If you
you would
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[]
knew that a fellow fisherman was using an illegal fishing method, what is the first thing
do? (1 option only)
Report him/her to the Fisheries Department
Report him/her to your community
Confront hirn/her
Report hirn/her to the beach lerder
Report him/her to the police
Nothing
Don't know
Other:
67 5
G15a Is there anywhere on this lake where you cannot fish? (1 option only)
[] River mouths
Fish nurseries
Open waters of the lake
Closed areas
Places of lightening/ghosts/spirits
Waters belonging to other communities
Fishes everywhere
Don't know
Other:
G15b If there are such places, why will you not fish there? (1 option only)
Because the Fisheries Dept. says I must not
Because you should not fish where fish breed
Because I am afraid of being too far from shore
Because these are sacred places
Because these are dangerous places
Fishes everywhere
Other:
016 What do you think is the single most important management problem on this lake?
Declining catches
Too many boats/fishermen
Lack of regulationliaw enforcement
Corruption
Illegal fishing techniques
Theft of gear
[71 flûn't knnw
G16 j 66
42
012 If someone from another beach came here, what would s/he have to do to get
permission to fish from your beach? (1 option only)
[1 J Get verbal permission from your beach authority 012 61[2] Show a letter of introduction
[3] Pay a fee or give part of their catch
[4] Nobody outside this community is allowed to fish from our beach
[51 No permission required
[6] Other:
G13 If you fished without permission in the waters of another community, what would happen? (i
option only)
[1] You would be chased away
[2] You would be seized and punished by the community G13 62
[3] Nothing
[4] Don't know
[5] Other:
G14 To whom does this beach belong? (1 option only)
[1] No one G4 63
[2] An individual
[3] A committee
[4] The government
(5] A cooperative
[6] Don't know
[7] Other:
01 Sb 65
G15a 64
G16 What do you think is the single most important management problem on this lake?
Declining catches
Too many boats/fishermen
[31 Lack of regulation/law enforcement
Corruption
Illegal fishing techniques
Theft of gear
Don't know
No problems
Others:
G17a In your village, are any of the following present?
Fisheries co-operatives
Marketing groups
Savings/credit groups
A beach committee
Other fishermen's groups
None of the above (Go to G 18)
Don't know (Go to Q18)
G i 7b If any of the above exist, are you a member of any of them?
[1] Yes [2] No
G18 In your fishing village are there fishing rules that are made by the community?
(No more than 2 options)
Taboos
Restrictions on when you can fish
Restrictions on where you can fish
Restrictions on who can fish
Restrictions on certain methods and/or gear
No rules
Don't know
Others:
H Fishing regulations
Hl We would like to know if the government' s fishing regulations help to conserve fish stocks on
the lake. Do you think the following are effective or useless?
H2 What is the minimum mesh-size for gill-nets
[1] 5 inches [2] Not 5 inches [3] Don't know
G18 172
G18 73-74
H2 83
43
Regulation Unaware of
regulation
Effective Useless
Mesh-size controls i 2 3
Areas closed to fishing i 2 3
Closed seasons i 2 3
Poison ban 2 3
Trawling ban i 2 3
Minimum landing sizes for fish i 2 3
Fishermen's licenses i 2 3
Boat registration 2 3
G16 66
Gl7 67-71
LAKE VICTORIA FISHER) 1S RESEARCH PROJECT
The Co-Management Sub-Project: Questionnaire for Fisheries Dept. and 'Jistrict
Administration officials
Name of enumerator:
Name of survey site:
2 District:
Date:
Respondent' s status:
3 What is the minimum mesh-size for gill-nets on Lake Victoria?
[1] 5 inches [2] Not 5 inches [3] Not sure
4 What other fishing gear and/or fishing techniques are illegal on Lake Victoria?
[i] Use of poison
Beach seines
Cast nets
Trawling
Don't know
Other:
5 Which regulations do you consider the most difficult to enforce? (1 option)
Licensing
Boat registration
Illegal mesh-size/gears
Closed seasons
Closed areas
AI! are difficult to enforce
AIl are easy to enforce
Other:
6 We would like to know whether you agree or disagree with any of the following
statements:
Case No.
-I-
o
44
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
Most on the nets ou Lake Victoria are illegal
H3 Over the year, arc there closed seasons in the places where you ir.mally fish? (13 $4
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
H4 Does the governmcnt ban you from fishing in certain areas? 114 85
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
7 Which of the following scenarios do you think represents the most effective
management option for the management of Lake Victoria's fisheries? (1 option only)
Management by communities only
Management by Fisheries Dept. only
Management equally shared between Fisheries Dept. and communities
Others:
8 What do you consider the worst problem that the Fisheries Dept. faces (1 option only)
Lack of funding
Inadequate staffing levels
Corruption
Lack of cars/boats
Poor relations with fishing communities
No problems
Don't know
[] Other:
[li No.:
[2] Don't know
16
8 J17
45
9 hi the District for which you are responsible, how many fishermen were arrested and
convicted in 1998 for breaking the fisheries regulations? 18
[1] No.:
[2] Don't know
10 How many fishermen do you estimate there to be in your district? 10 19
[1] No:
[2] Don't know
11 How many fishing boats do you estimate there to be in your district? 11 20
Catches per fisherman ore on the increase
Most fishermen have fishing licenses
Most of the lake's boats are registered
The current methods of managing the lake are the best there can be
LAKE VICTORIA FISH ERl ES RESEARCH PRO.I ECT
The Co-Management Sub-Procct: Qucstionnairc for Fish prOcessing factories
Name ofcnumcraor:
Name of survey site:
District:
Date:
Respondent's status factory:
t a Would your factory be interested in contributing towards the management of Lake Victoria?
II] Yes(GotoQlb) 2j No(GotoQlc)
I b lfycs, please provide three ways in which you think you can contribute:
[3]
Ic 1f no, give up to three reasons why not:
[1]
[2]
[3]
2 What do you understand 'co-management' to mean?
Case No.
46
Ic 5-7
la
lb 2-4
3 If you had the opportunity, would your factory be interested in contributing funding
towards any of the following:
4 How often do Fisheries Dept. personnel come to your factory?
Often
Sometimes
Never
5 As regards the Fisheries Department, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
6 If you could, in what 3 ways would you change the way in which the Fisheries Dept.
operates?
7 As concerns fish supply, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
5
16-18
1
22-26
47
Measure Yes No Not
sure
Patrolling by Fisheries Dept.s on beaches/lake 1 2 3
Quality assurance from point of capture to factory 1 2 3
Transport infrastructure between point of capture and factory 1 2 3
Assurance that only fish above a certain size are caught 1 2 3
Salaries for Fisheries Dept. personnel 1 2 3
Management overseen by fishermen's organisations 1 2 3
___________________________________________ Dis-
agree
Not
sure
The Fisheries Dept. does a good job managing the lake's fisheries 3
The Fisheries Dept. hinders our work more than it assists it 1 2 3
We would not be able to do our work without the assistance of the
Fisheries Dept.
2 3
In the hands of the Fisheries Dept., the future of Lake Victoria is bright 3
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
Running at full capacity now is less likely than 5 years ago 1 2 3
Each fish we receive now is, on average, the same size as the fish we
received 5 years ago.
1 2 3
We rarely have problems meeting our orders on time 1 2 3
The fish we buy now has, over the past 5 years, been of consistently high
quality
1 2 3
We are not affected by fish poisoning on the lake 1 2 3
6 19-21
Statement
Supply problems have partly arisen because of high demand from the
processing industry
Supply problems have partly arisen because there are too many
fishermen/boats/nets on the lake
Supply problems have partly arisen because of failure to properly
manage the lake
Supply problems have in part been caused by the inability of local
fishermen/suppliers to meet your quality standards
Agree
1
9 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the future:
48
Statement Agree Dis-
agree
Not
sure
The fishery will collapse in the next five years i 2 3
Given the chance, we would pull out and invest elsewhere 1 2 3
The future is bright and the markets will remain good 1 2 3
Dis-
agree
Not
sure
8 27-30
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
8 We would like to know what may be causing fish supply problems. Do you or
disagree with the following statements?
9 31-34
